LAB NOTE 001 FROM THE FABRICATION DESK
CIRVEX gives an autonomous machine a way to identify a tool, limit what it can cost, record what happened and settle payment on Solana.
01 THE PROBLEM
One task should not require unlimited authority.
An agent may need a price, a report or one approved transaction. It should not need permanent access to an entire wallet or application. A useful capability needs a clear identity, an exact version and a limit that its owner can inspect before use.
CIRVEX calls a reusable capability a Chip. A Machine is the account that chooses which Chip to install and who may report work for it. The onchain program does not run private tasks. It records the shared facts that another person should be able to inspect.
02 CHIP IDENTITY
A publisher creates a Chip under a program derived address. Each published revision has its own artifact digest and manifest digest. Revision numbers advance in order. Existing revisions cannot be silently overwritten, and a publisher can revoke one when necessary.
Those digests identify bytes. They do not certify that the bytes are safe. Before installing a Chip, a Machine owner still needs to inspect the manifest, the publisher and the executable package.
03 INSTALLATION AND AUTHORITY
The owner creates a Machine account and chooses an operator. Installing a Chip pins one revision and its two digests. The installation also records an expiry, one SPL token mint, a maximum cost per job, a rolling window limit and a payment route.
The route has three distinct recipients: publisher, executor and protocol. Their shares must total 100 percent. The owner can revoke an installation or change the Machine operator. The operator cannot edit those limits.
04 A JOB AND ITS RECEIPT
Work can happen away from the public ledger, where private input does not need to be exposed. An authorized operator then submits an invocation identifier, input digest, output digest and measured cost. The program checks the installed revision, expiry, per job ceiling and rolling budget before it creates a receipt.
The receipt is unique to that installation and invocation identifier, which prevents the same job from being recorded twice. It identifies the reporter and committed route. It is an attributable statement from an authorized operator, not cryptographic proof that the private computation was correct.
05 SETTLEMENT
A receipt can be settled only once. The program verifies the payment mint, the Machine controlled token vault and each recipient token account. It computes the committed split and transfers the exact cost through the SPL Token interface. The remaining rounding unit goes to the protocol recipient so the parts always add up.
06 WHAT THE SOURCE SHOWS
The board above maps each component to the actual Anchor program. Select a Chip to jump to the instruction or account definition responsible for that behavior. The source browser reads repository files at build time; it does not contain a separate handwritten version of the protocol.
The program compiles and its unit tests pass in GitHub Actions. The Solana program has not been deployed to a public cluster. The token CA shown in the header is separate from the program ID and does not establish protocol deployment. The current code does not include a hardened private execution sandbox or an independent proof of offchain results. Those boundaries are stated plainly because they matter.
07 THE DIRECTION
I want the next step to be a real end to end flow: a Machine installs a useful Chip, the job runs under narrow local permissions, the result is reported, and a recipient receives payment. The questions still open are how to verify private work, how to audit the executor and how to make a permission understandable before a user signs it.
I would rather have a small system people can inspect and use than a long catalog of capabilities that only sounds impressive. That is the standard I want CIRVEX to meet.
SOLANAANCHOREXPLICIT AUTHORITYRECEIPTSSPL TOKEN
CIRVEX lab note 001 / written from the implementation / September 2026